1 - Overview
Since 1964, nuclear deterrence has remained an essential foundation of France's defense. It constitutes a sovereign political choice, assumed by all presidents and governments of France’s Fifth Republic, and by the country’s Parliament through the vote of military programming laws and the annual vote on appropriations for defense.
Much more than a strategic option offered to the president of the Republic, consisting in being able to inflict, permanently and under any circumstances, unacceptable damage on any State or organization that would threaten France's vital interests,Nuclear Deterrence is a central and structuring element of a global political strategy in terms of security and defense.
It is the expression of a political will and is based on the fundamental notions of independence, permanence, credibility, strict sufficiency and excellence. .
Deterrence asserts a level of ambition and possesses several dimensions:
- The diplomatic imension, with the international responsibilities conferred on France by its status as a nuclear power (NPT), which is not unrelated to France's permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council
- The military dimension, with robust and credible conventional forces that participate in the exercise of its international responsibilities and that also make it possible to avoid any circumvention by raising the threshold for nuclear engagement
- The economic dimension through a continuous and regular budgetary effort by the Nation, consistent with the necessary adaptations made to the means of deterrence
- dimensions technological and industrial dimension with the development of sovereign technologies in a very broad spectrum of activities
- Finally, the adventure dimension, as deterrence relies on skills and values of excellence and rigor. Since the beginning, men and women in research laboratories, in industry, within the state organization, and in particular that of defense, in combat units, have put their skills at the service of this eminently demanding mission
This "common effort" is the embodiment of a choice: that of preserving our strategic autonomy and our freedom of action and decision. It is the ultimate guarantee of national security and independence.
In France, exercising deterrence requires, first and foremost, the will of the Head of State, the representative of the Nation, elected by universal suffrage, backed by parliamentary support and the assent of public opinion.
We must also have a sovereign capacity to assess the strategic situation of the adversary, a doctrine and its mode of expression, and finally effective and credible instruments of retaliation. This also requires a high-performance military tool capable of delivering strikes at any time and in any place against a state adversary attacking the vital interests of the Nation, and an industry capable of forging, over time, the most effective weapons, delivery systems and carriers to meet the objectives set by the President of the Republic.
This requires chains of governmental command and of nuclear security that manage the risks, that guarantee the execution of orders and that thus ensure the credibility of the deterrent.
Deterrence is therefore based on a rather complex "system of systems", all of which contribute to its credibility.
French deterrence is solely defensive and subject to a principle of strict sufficiency which limits the means dedicated to nuclear forces to what is strictly necessary. Like other sectors of defense, it has undergone budgetary and financial rigor, tending to pool resources between the different functions as much as possible.
2 – A Legal Framework based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
If nuclear deterrence contributes to stabilizing the international system and has been able to avoid a global conflagration between great powers, the multiplication of states possessing nuclear weapons could seriously complicate relations between possessing powers and the understanding of each other's positions. Moreover, it is not certain that all potential holders have the necessary rigor in the area of nuclear security and safety, which would by nature increase the risks of proliferation and accidents. For this reason, both the possessing powers and the international community have sought to implement legal instruments to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
In return, the possessing powers engage in mechanisms to limit or secure their capabilities. The main multilateral instrument that forms the basis of international law in this field is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has been supplemented by other treaties dealing with more technical aspects, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the ban on the production of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty or FMCT), or treaties aiming to prohibit nuclear weapons in certain regional or common areas (e.g. the Arctic Treaty of 1959 or the Rarotonga Treaty of 1985).
(1) The NPT
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed on the 1st of July, 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Review conferences are held every five years to adapt and evaluate its operation. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Treaty was extended indefinitely.
The NPT is based on three main pillars:
- Non-proliferation
- Disarmament
- Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
The treaty enshrines the monopoly of 5 states on nuclear weapons (the "Nuclear-Weapon states": the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China) and a general commitment by other states to not develop nuclear weapons. 190 states have joined the NPT. India, Pakistan and Israel have refused to ratify it and North Korea withdrew in 2003.
For their part, nuclear-weapon states undertake to pursue negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and for nuclear disarmament. They also undertake to pursue negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control.
Upon joining the NPT, the non-nuclear-weapon states —in return for renouncing nuclear weapons— considered it legitimate to obtain measures to ensure their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The United Nations Security Council recognized the legitimacy of this concern in Resolution 255 of June 19th, 1968, but it is really Resolution 984 of April 11th, 1995 that formalizes the security assurances issued by the five nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT.
The approach adopted by the NPT is that of a progressive construction of a global architecture of non-proliferation. Its quasi-universality and perpetuity make it a powerful instrument, but it is now being challenged by advocates of a more rapid path to total disarmament (cf. paragraph on TPNW).
(2) The CTBT
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was concluded in 1996, the year of the last French test campaign. State parties to the CTBT undertake not to conduct nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and generally not to participate in any way in the execution of nuclear weapon test explosions. An international organization, the CTBTO, was created to verify its application (seismic and hydroacoustic monitoring network). The CTBT never formally entered into force because eight countries subject to mandatory ratification did not ratify it: the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Iran and Egypt.
(3) Regional Treaties
Several treaties establish entire regions free of nuclear weapons. In these zones, France has undertaken not to deploy nuclear devices, not to conduct tests and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states present (negative security assurances).
- Antarctic Treaty (1959): prohibits the testing or deployment of nuclear weapons;
- Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967): establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South America
- Treaty of Rarotonga (1985): establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific
- Treaty of Bangkok (1995): establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia
- Treaty of Pelindaba (1996): establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa
- Treaty of Semipaltinsk (2006): establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia
Additionally, thematic treaties govern specific spaces, such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), which prohibits atmospheric and underwater testing, or the outer Space Treaty (1967), which prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons in space.
(4) The FMCT
The Fissile Material Cut-Off Draft Treaty (FMCT) aims to prevent the production of fissile material and thus the expansion of the nuclear powers' stockpiles.
(5) France has become an important component in the implementation of this approach and the NPT has since become the cornerstone of French non-proliferation policy. France has committed itself in an exemplary manner to a disarmament process. It is officially pursuing the objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons. It is the only country in the world: - to have irreversibly dismantled all test sites and to have replaced them with simulation facilities; - to have renounced its strategic and tactical ground-to-ground components; - to have reduced its ocean and airborne capabilities; - and to have reduced the number of its nuclear warheads (300 - in accordance with strict sufficiency requirements, see below).
3 – The Doctrine of Deterrence
The French doctrine of nuclear deterrence is described in the successive White Papers on Defense and National Security, reference documents which lay the groundwork for military programming laws.
It is explained and specified in the speeches made by successive presidents of the Republic. This recurrent address by the Head of State, who is also Head of the Armed Forces, conveys a message to the Nation, but also to the outside world. It is a manifestation of the continuity of this policy and its transparency.
For the current era, the speeches delivered in Cherbourg on March 21st, 2008 by Nicolas Sarkozy, in Istres on February 19th, 2015 by François Hollande and in Paris on February 7th, 2020 by Emmanuel Macron, serve as references.
3.1 - Guarantee of National Sovereignty
Nuclear deterrence aims to “ protect our country from any aggression of state origin against its vital interests, wherever it comes from, and whatever form it takes » (F. Hollande) by providing the capacity to inflict absolutely unacceptable damage on the adversary.
"Deterrence is the ultimate guarantee of the Nation's security, protection and independence. It permanently guarantees our autonomy of decision and our freedom of action within the framework of our international responsibilities, (...). Nuclear deterrence is therefore part of the more global framework of the national defense and security strategy, which takes into account all threats, including those below the threshold of vital interests." (White Paper on Defense and National Security, 2013).
"France's nuclear strategy, whose doctrinal bases I recalled earlier, is fundamentally aimed at preventing war." (Emmanuel Macron).
"It is strictly defensive. The use of nuclear weapons would obviously only be conceivable in extreme circumstances of self-defense, a right enshrined in the United Nations Charter." (N.Sarkozy)
3.2 - An Evolving Doctrine
A Doctrine Adapted to the Geostrategic Context
Use is determined not by the nature of the aggression, but by the president of the Republic's assessment of the harm to our vital interests.
This notion of vital interests is not precisely defined, nor is the notion of harm that could be inflicted upon our vital interests, nor the notion of damage that could be inflicted. It is the supreme responsibility of the president of the Republic to constantly assess the nature of our vital interests as well as the damage that could be done to them. (White Paper on Defense and National Security, 2013)
Vital interests are not strictly limited to the national territory.
- In this regard, special ties are affirmed with the United Kingdom, another allied nuclear power in Europe: "With the United Kingdom, we have made a major decision, we have found that there is no situation in which the vital interests of one would be threatened without the interests of the other also being threatened." (Nicolas Sarkozy) The joint commitments with the United Kingdom (bilateral declaration of 1995, Saint-Malo declaration, and then Lancaster House treaties of 2010) reflect a unique degree of trust, but do not call into question the independence of French deterrent forces.
- The French deterrent takes the construction of Europe into consideration: "We participate in the European project, we have built a community of destiny with our partners, the existence of a French nuclear deterrent makes a strong and essential contribution to Europe. France also has, with its European partners, a de facto and heartfelt solidarity. Who could therefore believe that an aggression, which would jeopardize the survival of Europe, would have no consequences?" (François Hollande)
But it was President Macron who most precisely affirmed the European dimension of the French nuclear deterrent by inviting a strategic dialogue in Europe: "...our nuclear forces play a dissuasive role of their own, particularly in Europe. They reinforce European security by their very existence and in this respect have a truly European dimension. On this point, our independence of decision is fully compatible with an unwavering solidarity with our European partners. Our commitment to their security and defense is the natural expression of our ever-deepening solidarity. Let us be clear: France's vital interests now have a European dimension.
On this point, our independence of decision is fully compatible with unwavering solidarity with our European partners. Our commitment to their security and defense is the natural expression of our ever closer solidarity. Let us be clear: France's vital interests now have a European dimension.
In this spirit, I would like to see the development of a strategic dialogue with our European partners who are ready and willing, on the role of the French nuclear deterrent in our collective security.
European partners who wish to engage in this process will be able to take part in the exercises of French deterrent forces. This strategic dialogue and these exchanges will naturally contribute to the development of a true strategic culture among Europeans." (Emmanuel Macron, February 7th, 2020)
Nuclear Warning
In exercising deterrence, France has the capacity to carry out this "nuclear warning". It also has a broad spectrum of modes of action, avoiding the "all" (massive strikes) or "nothing" approach, and allowing for strategic targeted effects (centers of power, industrial or economic capacities...) and nuclear warning capabilities, through the possible modulation of payloads.
No-First-Use: ʺNegative Security Assurancesʺ
In 1995, France made a unilateral declaration of negative security assurances (i.e., the guarantee to not be the first to use nuclear weapons), specifying that these assurances were intended for non-nuclear-weapon states which honor their commitments, under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was specified that these assurances did not call into question the right to self-defense enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
Great Britain has a similar formulation in its own nuclear doctrine.
The Principle of "Strict Sufficiency" or the Lowest Possible Level
According to the principle of strict sufficiency, the guarantee of unacceptable damage is ensured today with approximately XNUMX weapons (a mix of M-XNUMX missiles/FOST [Forces océaniques stratégiques, in English: Strategic Ocean Force] and ASMPA missiles/FAS [Forces aériennes stratégiques, in English: Strategic Air Force] and FANu [Forces aéronavales nucléaires, in English: Nuclear Naval Air Force]).
According to the 2008 White Paper: "France will continue to maintain its nuclear forces at a level of strict sufficiency. It will permanently adjust these forces to the lowest possible level compatible with its security. It will not seek to acquire all the means that its technological capabilities would allow it to develop. The level of its forces will not depend on that of other nuclear-armed actors, but only on the perception of risks and the analysis of the effectiveness of deterrence for the protection of our vital interests."
In the past, this assessment led France, in 1996, to dismantle its land component (strategic component equipped with ground-to-ground ballistic missiles, the Hadès mobile ground-to-ground pre-strategic system). It also led France to reduce the size of the FOST from six to four SNLEs (Sous-marins Nucléaires Lanceurs d'Engins, in English: Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines), and then between 6 and 4 to reduce the size of the FAS from three to two squadrons.
3.3 – Deterrence does not Exclude Pursuing the Objective of Disarmament
"France therefore shares the objective, in the long term, of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, but I would add: when the strategic context permits. France will continue to act relentlessly in this direction. It will do so consistently, transparently, truthfully, I was going to say wisely, and in good cooperation with Allies." – François Hollande
Today, France has an exemplary record, unique in the world, in nuclear disarmament. It is the first state, along with the United Kingdom, to have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; the first state to have decided to close down and dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile material for explosive purposes, thus ensuring that deterrence is based on a limited stockpile of nuclear material; the only country to have dismantled —in a transparent manner— its nuclear test site in the Pacific and to limit its experiments to test simulations only; the only country to have completely dismantled its ground-to-ground nuclear missiles; and the only country to have voluntarily reduced by one third the number of its Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines, followed by the reduction of its strategic air force (in 2008).
France pursues a policy of transparency regarding its nuclear arsenal.
These reductions are significant, particularly in view of the modesty of the French arsenal (designed according to a principle of strict sufficiency), compared to that of the two main nuclear-weapon states.
| Country | Warheads deployed | Other heads | Total inventory |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 1 744 | 1 964 | 3 708 |
| Russia | 1 588 | 2 889 | 4 477 |
| France | 280 | 10 | 290 |
Source SIPRI Yearbook
France's Participation in the Multilateral Framework for the Prevention of Nuclear Proliferation
France's efforts in the field of non-proliferation are deployed in three areas:
- Crisis management
- Strengthening of the international anti-proliferation regime
- Concrete actions to prevent and hinder proliferation
France is very much attached to the multilateral framework for the prevention of nuclear proliferation, of which it is a major participant, and has consistently supported initiatives in this direction. The adoption in 1997 of an Additional Protocol to the NPT’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements is in line with a logic of strengthening the IAEA's verification tools and inspection resources.
- France has contributed to the implementation and development of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. It has also contributed to the intercepting of shipments containing proliferation-related cargo in the framework of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSIXNUMX) and to the implementation of various multilateral action plans to prevent the risk of terrorism.
- France is a participant in the International Monitoring System set up by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and is responsible for 24 monitoring stations.
- In addition to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, France is a party to the protocols annexed to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ratified in 1974 and 1992), the Treaty of Rarotonga (ratified in 1996) and the Treaty of Pelindaba (ratified in 1996). It supports the goal of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. Through these various legal frameworks, France has provided negative security assurances to nearly 92 states.
- France supports the various informal groups of supplier countries: Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Australia Group, Zangger Committee, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), etc.
- France is the fifth largest contributor to the IAEA budget. 336 inspections relating to international control of nuclear materials were carried out in 2013 on French facilities under the Euratom Treaty and the IAEA.
3.4 - Asserted Opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
Adopted in July 2017 by 122 countries at the United Nations General Assembly, the Treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has been signed by 84 countries, ratified by 50 and will be implemented on January 22nd, 2021. It prohibits the use, possession, development, production, testing and threat of use of nuclear weapons. It will provide a legal framework for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) to stigmatize states, companies, and financial organizations associated with prohibited nuclear activities.
France's position was made explicit by President Macron in his February 7th, 2020 speech:
"The ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament is contained in the preamble of the NPT. But in the reality of our world, progress towards this goal can only be gradual, and based on a realistic perception of the strategic context.
In the absence of a recipe for the rapid disappearance of nuclear weapons from our world, the promoters of abolition are basically attacking the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence, and above all, let us be frank, where it is easiest to do so, i.e. in our European democracies.
I do not believe that the choice is between, on the one hand, a moral absolute with no connection to strategic realities, and, on the other hand, a cynical return to the sole balance of power without law. For my part, I will not fall into the trap of this false alternative. It is destabilizing for the architecture of international security and does not reflect France's ambitions for peace, multilateralism and law.
My responsibility is to ensure the security of our country, in compliance with its international commitments, in particular those of the NPT.
However, this does not mean that France has given up on ethical questions concerning nuclear weapons. A democracy must ask itself the question of the purpose of its nuclear deterrence policy, which is fraught with moral dilemmas and paradoxes...
Unilateral nuclear disarmament would be tantamount to exposing itself and its partners to violence and blackmail, or to relying on others to ensure its security. […]
In the same spirit, France will not join a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would not create any new obligations for France, either for the State or for public or private actors on its territory.
Disarmament only makes sense if it is part of a historical process of limiting violence.
The strategy of deterrence already contributes to this, even in a paradoxical way."