In the middle of a vast clearing, a small, isolated hotel.
Andrea, seated in the back of a plain, black luxury car, cheerfully gets out and pushes open the hotel door. Since becoming head of state, Andrea hasn't visited his cousin, who owns and manages the hotel. No sooner has he arrived than he's informed that two guests, who introduce themselves as Michele and Frédéric, have been waiting for him in the private lounge for less than five minutes. Andrea joins them in the silence of the hotel, which has clearly been reserved exclusively for him.
After the usual pleasantries, Andrea spoke:
“Our three states have appointed small, specialized teams to work over the past nine months on issues related to Europe’s possession of nuclear weapons. They have structured their deliberations around five questions.
1/ Does Europe need its own ultimate nuclear defense?
2/ Can Europe, with its states not yet possessing nuclear weapons, develop its own nuclear arsenal reasonably quickly while still maintaining the credibility essential to the concept of deterrence?
3/ Is it possible to be sure that the United Kingdom can deploy its nuclear arsenal in a completely autonomous manner, that is to say without prior agreement from the American President?
4/ What is the quantitative and qualitative value of the French nuclear arsenal?
5/ How can France's repeated proposals to extend its nuclear umbrella to European countries be put into practice?
Andrea continues by specifying that the first four questions were answered simply and that he proposes, if they wish, that Michele and Frédéric present a summary of them.
Michele then intervened, accepting Andrea's proposal and indicating that the work of the small teams, and even their existence, must remain secret for the time being. They could only be made public with the agreement of the three heads of state. This would likely only happen during an international crisis that would raise public awareness of the need for the ultimate protection of their territories.
Frédéric specifies that during the work of the restricted teams, representatives from other European countries were consulted as well as specialized think tanks including Visyum.
He then summarizes the conclusions of the teams limited to the first two questions.
“The answer to the first question was immediately obvious. Europe needs a credible nuclear defense in all circumstances, which implies that it must be its own. Indeed, NATO's nuclear weapons and their American complement, the use of which naturally requires the agreement of the American President, however useful they may be, cannot be considered as being mobilizable in all circumstances required by Europe. History, both distant and recent, clearly indicates this.”
He continues by addressing the second question.
"It has been addressed in its scientific, technical, industrial, political and legal dimensions. All these considerations have given way to a small number of them converging towards the same answer."
First, even starting from a high technological and technical base, deploying a weapon, its delivery system, and its physical and human environment is unrealistic in less than 10 to 15 years. This timeframe is incompatible with the observed deterioration of international relations.
Furthermore, the credibility of nuclear weapons, being crucial for establishing deterrence, requires successful tests of their functionality. Such tests are inconceivable on European territory. Theoretically, they could be relocated to host countries or extranational zones. In practice, however, such an operation would be impossible to conceal, even in its preparations. It would likely expose states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons to considerable diplomatic and economic pressure, and even to the risk of preemptive attacks aimed at preventing them from taking place.
Michele then spoke:
"The third question also received a simple answer. Europe cannot be certain that the United Kingdom has all the powers to unilaterally deploy its nuclear arsenal, that is, without the agreement of the American president."
“The fourth question,” Michele indicates, “has been the subject of numerous studies, consultations obviously extended to the services of the three states. Of course, access to the internal data of the French DAM or the French army was not possible. Nevertheless, a flow of converging information has emerged. The French nuclear weapon, or rather the French nuclear arsenal, enjoys undeniable credibility. Its volume, defined by the French as being sufficient, can be accepted as such.”
Michele, having tasted the hotel's excellent chamomile tea, continued. "Dear Andrea, before I let you address the fifth question, the answers to which will be longer than those of the first four, allow me to outline, as I initially intended, the red lines for France and other European countries, given the current situation within the European Union, should the French umbrella be extended to Europe. Red lines not in the sense used by President Obama, but in their fullest sense. It became clear to the teams that there were three red lines in both scenarios."
For France:
- Recognition of French primacy in the field of defense nuclear technology (70 years of work, successful tests, scientific, technical and industrial autonomy, simulation capabilities…)
- Holding a permanent seat on the UN Security Council
- The final employment decision rests with the French President.
For Europe:
- Access to a broad and detailed knowledge of the French nuclear arsenal (resources, availability, use scenarios, maintenance, etc.)
- Access, the terms of which will need to be specified, to the development programs decided or envisaged
- Implementation of a structure for regular exchanges and crisis management with mandatory consultation, including just before any potential employment decision.
And Michele concluded: the acceptance of repeated offers from France, and in particular the latest one presented by Emmanuel Macron, must absolutely be preceded by a second, namely the acceptance of these red lines, with or without conditions, by all parties.
Andrea then addresses the main conclusions reached by the Tripartite Group on the implementation of the French proposal.
The first, and most fundamental, point is that France and the Europeans must first share a mutually acceptable understanding of the reasons for extending the benefits of the French nuclear umbrella. As things stand, Emmanuel Macron and his predecessors propose this extension because they consider the countries of the European Union to be among France's vital interests. This reasoning de facto creates a situation of vassalage of the EU countries to France, which is unacceptable. This is all the more unacceptable given that our experts believe other, equally important reasons motivate the French proposal: the first is undoubtedly that technological advancements are making adversary defenses more effective every day, and therefore making the development of French nuclear weapons more expensive in order to maintain their credibility. Despite the recognition of French primacy, a scientific, technical, or financial contribution from the member states of the European Union will undoubtedly be essential for France if it wishes to maintain a credible nuclear arsenal in the face of the two or three superpowers poised to impose a new world order. Other, more technical reasons, according to the conclusion of this tripartite group, would also make the project's motivations more balanced. For example, a proliferation of military bases implementing deterrence across the Union would greatly complicate the strategy of our adversaries, while the limited number of ground-based assets available to France can be seen as a weakness, potentially reinforcing doubts among some regarding France's capacity to ensure the ultimate defense of Europe.
In reality, according to our experts, all states, including France, would benefit in one way or another from the extension of the French nuclear umbrella, and a balanced presentation of these shared interests would make the project more acceptable to all European populations, including the French.
A second conclusion concerns international legal aspects, since the uses of nuclear energy, both civilian and military, are strictly regulated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). All European Union member states are parties to this Treaty, which implies that, with the exception of France, they have all committed to developing only peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For its part, by acceding to this Treaty, France has prohibited itself from transferring any physical or intellectual property related to nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear-weapon state. None of the European Union member states currently wishes to reconsider its adherence to the NPT, and it should be reiterated that the European Union, which is not a state, cannot be a party to the NPT. As things stand, if it were nevertheless to decide to acquire nuclear weapons, it would, like the People's Republic of Korea, be ostracized by the international community, and its member states would, at the very least, be subject to very severe international sanctions.
Under these conditions, extending the security guarantee of France's nuclear deterrent to other European Union member states is legally possible only if France remains the sole possessor of nuclear weapons. Due to their adherence to the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states of the Union cannot, in particular, access French technical and scientific programs. This does not, however, preclude exchanges between France and other EU member states to agree on the "interfaces" between current and future weapons and the resources under the jurisdiction of those other states: ground infrastructure, weapon-carrier interface, safety specifications, implementation guidelines, etc.
Another conclusion, Andrea continued, largely a consequence of the first conclusion I reported before Frédérique's remark, concerns the project's "internal European" political dimension. Indeed, because the various deterrents around the world are all strictly national, France, as a nuclear-armed state, can only provide a security guarantee to another state within the framework of a defense agreement, similar to the security guarantees provided by the United States to Japan through the 1951 Mutual Defense Agreement, or to members of the Atlantic Alliance.
Our tripartite group of experts therefore considers that France should conclude a mutual defense agreement with the other states of the European Union, which presents no obstacle, except perhaps to provoke strong American reluctance.
The Group also produced an analysis of the practical aspects of implementing French nuclear weapons under such an agreement.
The first point highlighted was the apparent difference in "purpose" between French deterrence and the American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe: the latter are considered tactical weapons, whose primary use would therefore be "the battlefield." In contrast, French weapons are strategic weapons designed to guarantee France's ultimate security. However, the Tripartite Group noted that the strategic-tactical distinction is purely formal and political, sometimes linked to the range of the missiles that carry them, but that nothing technically prevents the use of a French ASMPA missile on a battlefield and that American B61 bombs could also have a strategic use.
Our Group therefore concludes that the weapons of the French Deterrent are capable of fulfilling all the functions that are currently assigned to those of NATO.
As is the case within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the French Guarantee could be structured around two lines of action: the ultimate strike capability could be provided by the submarine component, which can only be deployed within a French national framework, while all European Union member states could participate in the implementation of the airborne component, notably by making air bases available on some of their territories after they have been equipped with infrastructure enabling the secure management of weapons. These weapons would then necessarily benefit from dual control, jointly carried out by a French team and a team from the host country.
Hosting airborne weapons on the territory of certain European states would allow for a wider dispersal of French nuclear weapons, strengthening the credibility of deterrence by complicating the task of adversaries seeking to destroy this component. This hosting could be the preliminary step in European nuclear cooperation, which could be extended by granting these states the capability to carry these weapons. Specifically, some of their aircraft could deploy French weapons, provided their flight control system includes the essential "Standard" for conducting the nuclear mission, currently F3, and in the future F5. Because it must guarantee the absolute security of its deterrent, France cannot share these Standards on aircraft whose systems are under non-European control. This implies that European states wishing to deploy French weapons will have to equip themselves either with two-seat Rafale B aircraft or with European aircraft whose systems have been certified by France. These are the same reasons, with Germany being the best example, that require NATO states wishing to continue deploying American B61 bombs stationed in Europe to equip themselves with dual-capable American F35 aircraft.
Finally, to ensure the nuclear mission, France and the European states concerned will have to exclusively share the same ultra-secure communications network.
Our tripartite group believes that the implementation of the French airborne component by certain European states is the surest way to strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence and to lay the foundation for a genuine common defense, eventually including a conventional dimension. It considers that the crucial "government oversight" function exercised by the French government can be fulfilled through the French oversight team that would be present at each airbase hosting French weapons.
Operationally, our experts stressed the importance of joint training for the various European air forces, ensuring that all teams involved in implementing this extended deterrence have the necessary knowledge and reflexes.
Beyond training, France conducts Operation Poker four times a year, a way to demonstrate the operational and technical credibility and high level of expertise of its airborne nuclear component to its allies and competitors alike. This mission mobilizes around forty aircraft from the French Strategic Air Forces, primarily Rafale B fighters and A330 MRTT tankers. These assets are supplemented by conventional fighter jets, such as Mirage 2000-5s and Rafale Cs, which accompany the raid.
Our tripartite group emphasizes the need for the participation of the various European air forces in Operation Poker. This would allow for the testing and evaluation of common operational procedures, equipment, and infrastructure under realistic conditions, from the planning phase to the execution of a nuclear strike. Furthermore, at the European level, nuclear-capable air bases, as well as conventional air and naval bases, should also mobilize their air traffic controllers, protection squadrons, and surface-to-air defense squadrons in support of the operations.
Therefore, the Tripartite Group strongly recommends that the French nuclear deterrent, extended to the Member States of the European Union, not be limited to a simple expansion of the territory covered by the French umbrella, but should allow, at the operational level, for genuine participation by European air forces. Beyond strengthening French operational capabilities, this participation would greatly enhance the credibility of European nuclear defense and European esprit de corps.
For the proper functioning of this organization and its acceptance by the various partner states in this nuclear cooperation, the Tripartite Group considers it essential to establish appropriate governance. Ongoing consultation is deemed indispensable, and our experts propose the establishment of several bodies for this purpose:
A common clearance for "Nuclear Secrecy" that all participants in Extended Deterrence – including Heads of State and Government – will have to acquire. This will make in-depth technical exchanges possible, in particular exchanges on target planning, nuclear security and the fight against proliferation;
An ultra-secure communications system between the various European Heads of State and Government. Leaders must be able to organize a strictly private videoconference at their level with very short notice, particularly to be able to consult with each other in times of crisis;
A Council of Heads of State and Government meets regularly each year to update the shared strategic vision, validate the options submitted by technical experts, define the objectives to be achieved in the coming years, and study how to distribute the financial burden. It is clear that, as parties to the NPT, European states cannot directly contribute to the expenditures related to nuclear weapons programs themselves, but these represent only a fraction of the total expenditure. The remainder—infrastructure, delivery systems, communications, and command systems—could be the subject of joint development and shared costs. This does not preclude, in the interest of equitable burden-sharing, the Heads of State and Government from deciding on an equalization rule with conventional warfare expenditures.
An Operational Planning Committee, responsible in particular for preparing files for the Council and overseeing the proper execution of the latter's decisions.
"So," concluded Andréa, "these are the main points of the analysis of the French proposal carried out by our tripartite group of experts. Of course, many less important points have not yet been addressed. This will need to be done quickly because, as always, the devil is in the details. However, I believe that it is on the basis of the group's conclusions, which I have just reported to you, that we must make our decision and, of course, engage with the French side without delay to ensure that our vision for implementing Emmanuel Macron's proposal is acceptable to them."